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ABSTRACT
Nothing is simple in planning, financing, and delivering health care. Whatever changes in the system, it has 
both anticipated and unexpected consequences, which may be positive or negative. This makes reforming 
health care extremely challenging. Reforming the hospitals in Bulgaria is a difficult task, especially com-
bined with the difficult transition process in all countries of Eastern Europe and the tendencies like growing 
costs of care, ageing of the population, higher levels of chronic disease and disability, increased availability 
of new treatments, rising public expectations, increased pressure to spend more on health care and use the 
available resources more efficiently. The present work uses the example of hospital change process started in 
newly accepted in EU European countries, particularly in Bulgaria, and proposes discussion about the po-
tential of the “New Public Management” model as a mean of improvement the capacity of state to adopt the 
contractual approach of regulation. In conclusion, we stress that if the “control by state” was not the best so-
lution, “market regulation” have also some limits so there could be a third way - the supervised competition 
– a possible cure for the success of hospitals and health care reform in Bulgaria. 
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INTRODUCTION
It takes a big effort to begin,
It takes a big effort to terminate,
But the biggest effort is to continue!
Vladimir Bashev, Bulgarian poet
Health care systems are facing incredible 
change in the last several decades. Different mod-
els and rules are widely discussed and implemented. 
The main reason that made the reforms in this field a 
special subject of interest and attention both for poli-
ticians and researchers is its specifics:
 ❖ Healthcare system is important for guaranty-
ing health and life - basic human rights and val-
ues of highest level, but also an economic re-
source on which depends the welfare of the state 
- more health means production of more GDP.
 ❖ Healthcare system is one of the most sensitive 
fields of public interest, often used in elections 
as a mean for drawing attention and attaining 
political victory through promising efficiency, 
quality, equity of care access, safety, continuity, 
legality, neutrality.
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 ❖ Healthcare is one of the most complex fields – 
it combines the requirements and interests of 
many different stakeholders (patients, payers, 
providers, pharmaceutical companies etc.) that 
evolve continuously.
 ❖ Healthcare is one of the most expensive fields 
in every economy – it spends a serious amount 
of the state budget and this defines the need 
for striving to efficiency and efficacy in its 
government.
During the period of change the theories for 
structuring the system had a long evolution, which 
finally led to the diversity of models – from the free 
market regulation (the example of USA) to state plan-
ning and regulation (Semashko model in former So-
viet union, Beveridge model in the UK). Every model 
offers different possibilities and limitations – there is 
no a perfect one.
The change in Bulgarian health system started 
after 1989 – the year of beginning of a serious po-
litical and social shift, concerning every element of 
the social and economical sphere in the country. The 
state regulated health care system, financed through 
national tax payments (according to the Russian 
Semasko model) had led to many problems and were 
substituted by a public health insurance model. The 
health care reform gave autonomy of the health care 
establishments and put them in a completely new 
“market” conditions. The main changes affected the 
way Bulgarian hospitals were financed, managed, or-
ganized and structured. This new paradigm in hos-
pital management intended to introduce the require-
ment for effectiveness and to turn hospital govern-
ment into business-like management. In the present 
paper under “hospital reform” we have in mind the 
following definition (29): process, in which simul-
taneously or consistently changes in the health pol-
icy and law foundation in the hospital field were im-
plemented, as well the examination of organization-
al relationships, institutions and the structure of the 
sector that influence and force the system to shift 
into completely new condition.
Although the experts said this model was the 
most appropriate for Bulgarian health care system 
concerning its historical tradition (First health in-
surance law was adopted in 1918) and the overall ten-
dencies in the countries from the Central and East-
ern Europe, 17 years later it has become obvious that 
it didn’t achieve the planned results. It turned to be 
that changing the role of the state was not the cure 
for the old and sick health care system, it was consid-
ered to be.
The changes in the economical conditions in 
Bulgaria as well accessing the EU make important 
the performance of a serious analysis of the present 
situation in every system of the national economy, 
including the health care. It is needed to assess the 
directions for the future and the completion of the 
set targets, the positive and negative effects and the 
achievements during the past period as well the fail-
ures from the previous years. The intention of the au-
thors is to give a possible solution that could bring 
the vitality of the system and might preserve it from 
crashing down again through investigating the pos-
sibilities for implementation of the new public man-
agement model in Bulgarian hospital reform.
The New Public Management Model
The foundation of every health care system and 
the way it is organized and managed is unique. De-
spite it is not precisely, according to theory can be 
presented 4 basic, relatively pure and simple models 
of the health care systems which are (19):
 ❖ The “Beveridge” Model – named after Wil-
liam Beveridge, the social reformer who de-
signed Britain’s National Health Service, found-
ed in 1944. In this model financing and insur-
ing is performed by one institution, i.e. the pro-
cesses of funding and delivering of health care 
service are not separated and are fully or par-
tially bond with one organization. All the cit-
izens receive health care, no matter of their fi-
nancial status. The biggest system based on that 
model is the NHS in UK, as well the systems 
of Scandinavian countries, Italy, Spain, Portu-
gal and Greece. 
 ❖ The “Bismarck” Model – named after Otto 
Eduard Leopold von Bismarck-Schönhausen 
- Prussian and later German politician. The 
model was introduced in Germany in 1881. 
This is a health insurance model that had been 
more or less adapted in almost all Europe, in-
cluding Eastern European countries. The main 
principle of the model is the so called “cross 
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subsidization”, i.e. the young and healthy pay 
for the old and sick.
 ❖ The “Semashko” model (33) – worked in the 
beginning of founding the Soviet Union. It was 
named after a Russian doctor, who founded a 
system in which there was a great number of 
doctors, a smaller number of medical staff, and 
a developed network of hospitals even in the 
most secluded settlements. Another special fea-
ture is the banning of private medical practice 
and the small salaries of the medical personnel. 
The financing of the system is centralized. The 
hospitals and maternity homes are spread to the 
smallest villages of the country and that pro-
vokes the excessive requirement of numerous 
personnel and resources of maintenance. This 
model was popular in Soviet Union and coun-
tries from the Eastern Europe, including Bul-
garia to 1993.
 ❖ The “Kennedy” model - named after the 
American president John Fitzgerald Kennedy. 
This model is used in the USA since the 60s of 
the twentieth century. According to this model 
the health care is provided by the private sector 
by the regulation of the market. This model is 
applied mainly in the USA and Asia.
Every country around the world establishes its 
own health care system using one or a combination 
of several models, described above. In the same time 
lots of authors stress the common problem in all the 
countries: continuously growing health expenses 
and difficulties in controlling them. As the health-
care arena becomes more and more complex, the 
population ages and the cost of technology increas-
es, the efficient provision of healthcare within a glo-
balized economy is more important than ever before 
(17). There is a growing understanding that health-
care systems cannot be isolated from the rest of soci-
ety and economy: in order to be more effective they 
must interact within other areas including but cer-
tainly not restricted to, education, employment, pen-
sions, social welfare, science and competitiveness. 
This is the reason public sectors of the devel-
oped world have undergone a remarkable two de-
cades starting in the 80’s of public management re-
form, variously labeled as “new public management” 
(13) (NPM), “managerialism” and “reinventing gov-
ernment” (32). As every new theory is has been de-
veloped in different variations. This led to a cacoph-
ony of voices that characterizes the discussions of ad-
ministrative reform in Central and Eastern Europe – 
the strategies are so differentiated already that if we 
place them head-to-head they will form a nearly per-
fect circle that has no center or compass (21). In com-
mon case the purpose of this model for public man-
agement appeared to be improving the efficiency of 
the public structures. Situated on a crossroad, it pro-
vides the balance between two specific and problem-
atic situations: the predominating role of the state 
and the free market adverse events (25). The engine 
of the reform of public sector government was the 
concern and need of public administration rational-
ization – a “Copernicus’s revolution” (36) of a “rein-
vention of role of state” (27).
The liberals, and also the new sociologic ap-
proach of organization (5), underline the lack of ef-
ficiency in the “Weber bureaucracy” (6), character-
ized by a hierarchy of functions, place of the profes-
sionals and the impersonality of rules. They propose 
the NPM as a possible cure that transfers market and 
business principles as well management techniques 
from the private into the public sector, symbiotic and 
based on the neo-liberal understanding of state and 
economy.
Changing the direction of the managerial log-
ic of administration, which instead of privileging the 
rule and following the formal procedures, acts in its 
own interest regardless the satisfaction of the clients 
and the results, the new approach establishes itself 
as a mean of limiting the perverse effects of the re-
lations dominated by the public service agents and 
which the bureaucratic model cannot control. The 
object is to introduce the spirit of venture in the pub-
lic administrations (14) so that they are guided by 
their mission and goals and not by rules and proce-
dures; the users are considered as clients and the aim 
is the final result, instead of resources.
This coherent model includes creating mar-
kets or quasi-markets for a category of services there, 
were exists a monopole of the state. It is based on the 
distinction of roles between the provider of the ser-
vices and the decider/ controller (the new role of the 
state is to evaluate ex post and no long plan ex ante). 
It establishes as well competition between the public 
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and private sector for access to services agreements 
(23) by state. The manager occupies here an impor-
tant function. He is responsible for preserving the 
right of the users with the obligation to take into ac-
count the results and the optimal use of empowered 
resources (11).
The new public model is build on the basis of 
the agency theory, that is directed at the ubiquitous 
agency relationship, in which one party (the princi-
pal) delegates work to another (the agent – an actor 
that solves an optimization problem), who performs 
that work (9). The theory argues that under condi-
tions of incomplete information and uncertainty, 
which characterize most business settings, two agen-
cy problems arise (8): adverse selection (the condi-
tion under which the principal cannot ascertain if 
the agent accurately represents his ability to do the 
work for which he is being paid) and moral hazard 
(the condition under which the principal cannot be 
sure if the agent has put forth maximal effort). This 
agency dilemma leads to the need of control of the 
appropriateness of the actions of the agent from the 
principal and these costs increase with the distance 
between them (26). 
As hospitals represent kind of social institu-
tions, that interact with other institutions inside and 
outside the health care field it is important to study 
how this interaction influences the change process. 
This lies in the basics of the so called “New institu-
tionalism” theory. According to it, in every institu-
tion there is institutional equilibrium and though not 
everyone is necessarily happy with the current insti-
tutional structure, a significant coalition is or else it 
would not, by definition, be stable. Once institution 
is stabilized, it becomes very difficult to change the 
rules because no one can be certain what the out-
comes of the new structure would be. This is because 
institutions shape strategies, and the new institution-
al rules, imply new strategies throughout the system. 
Change thus implies enormous uncertainty. This is 
the reason that makes actors unwilling to change the 
structure (31). The effort to achieve rationality with 
uncertainty and constraint leads to homogeneity of 
structure. This phenomenon is called institution-
al isomorphism and it states that as an innovation 
spreads, a threshold is reached beyond which adop-
tion provides legitimacy rather than improves per-
formance (7). Isomorphism is a “constraining pro-
cess that forces one unit to resemble other units that 
face the same set of environmental conditions”.
The Role Of The State In Bulgarian Health 
Care System 
Until 1996 Bulgarian hospital sector was orga-
nized as a centralized, state monopolized and con-
solidated command type administrative system by 
the example of Semashko model of central plan-
ning inherited from the communist era (the name 
Semashko came from the name of the author of this 
system in former Soviet Union). The main and only 
player in this system was the state – owner and man-
ager of health care sector. 
 ❖ Law framework: The law framework of the 
health care sector in Bulgaria was based on two 
main laws that formed the regulation and fi-
nancing of the health care – “Law of popula-
tion’s health” and “Law of the state budget”. Ac-
cording to the law there were National centres, 
University hospitals, Regional hospitals, Mu-
nicipality hospitals.
 ❖ Ownership: After the nationalization in the 
health care field (since 1946-1949) until 1991 
the all the structures and resources in the 
health care were owned by the state. There were 
two kinds of health establishments – owned by 
the state and partially owned by the municipal-
ities. There were not private hospitals and sub-
sequently – no competition.
 ❖ Management: The administration, manage-
ment and planning of the whole system was 
centralized and performed by the state. There 
were only two levels of the health care system 
– ambulatory care and hospital care. Often 
the hospital provided both. The hospitals were 
managed by a head doctor, who didn’t have au-
tonomy to act as a manager but as an admin-
istrator. There was not requirement for proper 
economical education for this position.
 ❖ Financing: With the «socialistic restructur-
ing» in the health care since 1950 the health 
insurance was substituted by centralized state 
government and planning. The system was fi-
nanced by general taxation through the na-
tional and regional (municipality) budgets. 
The main principle in forming those budgets 
was the extrapolation on the base of the previ-
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ous fiscal year regarding the percentage of in-
flation. The amount of money that hospital did 
not spend was given back to the state budget. 
 ❖ Patient’s choice: There was not free choice of 
a doctor or health establishment – instead the 
distribution of patients was performed by na-
tional administrative system according the 
state planned areas. Practically all the popula-
tion was secured by the state – basic right set in 
the Constitution of the country (4). All medical 
services and medicines provided were free for 
the patient and paid by the state.
 ❖ Hospital professionals’ salaries: traditional-
ly, Soviet Union countries the salaries of med-
ical personnel were kept at 70-80 percent of the 
average salary (35). They were formed like con-
stant salary plus percentage for years/length of 
service and adapted speciality.
The state monopolized system became slowly 
more and more bureaucratic (30). Because of the ad-
ministrative regulating there were not mechanisms 
to link the interests of the citizens with those of the 
medical personnel; the invested resources in health 
care with the results. There were financed not results 
with certain qualitative and quantitative character-
istics but institutions and structures. Together with 
the obligation for universal entitlement health care 
system became inefficient and underfinanced. In ad-
dition, the political and economic crisis in the 1990s 
resulted in financial malfunctioning within the sec-
tor, including increased public debt for the hospitals, 
corruption and informal payments. The several eco-
nomical shocks during the transition period led to 
substantial decrease of the living standard and the 
health of population. The consequences were dimin-
ishing the ability of the system to provide health care 
and increased need for it (20).
The Scenario Of A Change
Since the start of the transition period in Bul-
garia in 1989, all social systems have undergone dra-
matic changes. Since 1997 started a radical reorga-
nization of Bulgarian health care. There were two 
main reasons that led to this process and that drove 
the change of the model of the health care system:
1. The analysis of health indicators showed that the 
health of the population was seriously damaged 
(22) – the data indicated high rates of social dis-
eases, disabilities, overall and childrens’dead, 
low health education and life style. It was ob-
vious that the system failed to achieve its main 
target – preserving the health and preventing 
the disease to ensure healthy population.
2. The lack of effectiveness and the present ineffi-
ciency of the system led to the need of restruc-
turing of the national law framework, manage-
ment, structure, ownership, organization and 
financing.
Although the health care reform started in 
1997 it concerned only the ambulatory care. Until 
2001 hospitals remained intact. The only thing that 
changed was that their budget was linked with the 
number of the treated patients (number of hospital-
izations). After 2001 the reform in hospital sector 
started. The changes concerned:
 ❖ Model of the system: The contract mod-
el, based on the public-private mix was intro-
duced. It contained of public, regional and pri-
vate sector as well social insurance sector (in-
cluding public element, represented by the Na-
tional Health Insurance Fund and corporate el-
ement – represented by the private health in-
surance companies). Ambulatory and hospital 
care were divided and registered as different es-
tablishment. The GP as a part of the health sys-
tem and gatekeeper was introduced. The hospi-
tals and other health establishments were put at 
a completely new market (quasi-market) condi-
tions. An accreditation process for all health es-
tablishments was introduced but started first in 
hospitals as an instrument for assessment of ca-
pacity and quality management on institution-
al, structural and personal level.
 ❖ Law framework: Until the 2001 there was a sig-
nificant development of the health law – the 
new era in health care system was paved with 
the newly created Law for the health establish-
ments, Trade law, the Health insurance law, and 
the normative for Accreditation of hospitals etc. 
The hospital sector was diversified and new 
kinds of hospitals were introduced (like spe-
cialized hospitals for acute treatment, for long-
term treatment and care, for rehabilitation, dis-
pensaries with beds, hospices, houses for social-
medical services (for old people or children)). 
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All of them had the right to be national, region-
al, interregional, municipality or university af-
ter the proper accreditation. All types of insti-
tutions, whether state-owned, municipal or pri-
vate, have equal status and rights. As public re-
mained psychiatric hospitals, emergency care 
centres, haemotransfusiology centres etc. Na-
tional medical standards were introduced, con-
cerning both ambulatory and hospital care.
 ❖ Ownership: the new structure of the hospi-
tal sector introduced the parallel existence of 
three equal forms of ownership (mainly corpo-
rative) – public private (state and municipality) 
and private. The design of hospital system, their 
distribution, planning and development were 
set by the National and Regional Health Maps, 
which are to be updated every 5 years. They in-
cluded the number and types of health estab-
lishments in the different areas (regions and 
municipalities) that are allowed to sign a con-
tract with the regional branch of the National 
health insurance health fund. The possibility 
for privatization started to be discussed. 
 ❖ Management: The hospitals become indepen-
dent. According the Trade law and the Law for 
the health establishments they were registered 
as trade companies, working for profit with 
considerable autonomy (2001). The require-
ment for education or qualification in health 
care management was set to the position of hos-
pital director (18). He was expected to rule the 
hospital as a manager through setting a hospital 
strategy according to the national health strat-
egy and regional needs of the population and 
conducting effective performance. 
 ❖ Financing: Since 2001 was stopped the pro-
cess of subsidizing of hospitals and hospital’s fi-
nancing was set on the contract model with the 
Ministry of health, 20% of which based on the 
performed activities according to certain qual-
ity and quantity. In 2002 started the financ-
ing based on contract between the hospital and 
the National health insurance fund for clinical 
pathways. Hospitals were allowed to have addi-
tional payments from private health insurance 
companies, cash from patients and companies, 
donations and etc.
 ❖ Patient’s choice: it was given choice to the pa-
tients to choose their GP and together with him 
– the hospital; of course in relation of their con-
dition (acute, chronic etc.) and the services they 
needed. A competition between the hospitals 
was started. They had to adapt to the new mar-
ket conditions with more informed and free in 
their choice patients, requirements of the soci-
ety and the continuous political changes – i.e. 
the interests of many stakeholders.
 ❖ Hospital professionals’ salaries: Besides the 
old way of forming the salary an additional new 
element was added – an amount for medical ac-
tivities performed for completing clinical path-
ways, financed by the National Health Insur-
ance Fund. That allowed to hospital managers 
to bond the performance of the doctor with its 
salary.
The Final Results Of The Reform
The basic characteristic of the transformation of 
health system in Bulgaria was the radically changed 
legal status and the full juridical, financial and man-
agerial autonomy of the hospitals. Twelve years after 
the start of the reform (1996-2008) in hospital sector, 
it turned to be that the hospitals are one of the weak-
est elements of the health system (2). Although all the 
pressures for change, the hospital sector reform still 
didn’t achieve the set targets:
 ❖ Worsening the health of the population was 
slowed down but not stopped – the separate in-
dicator’s improvements are still not an evidence 
for a positive trend. 
 ❖ The state monopoly was eradicated long after 
the 1990 – in 1996-2000 and it still continues to 
manifest. The formation of the new health sys-
tem and hospital reform in particularly is done 
slowly, fragmented (outside the logic of the re-
form in the other elements of the health sys-
tem) and not synchronized with the radically 
changing political, economical and social con-
ditions in the country. There is no clear vision 
for the future in form of strategy for the health 
sector (despite several attempts were made 
in 2001, 2004 and 2006). The National health 
map is ready only as a framework but it is not 
published yet and is not used as a managerial 
tool, what it is considered to be. There is still 
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not a clear idea for the needs of the regions in 
the country and the functions of the hospitals 
so that they can offer accessible, adequate and 
qualified medical care (38).
 ❖ Inadequate financing (12) - in spite the adop-
tion of the financing based on clinical pathways 
(close to the French model) there has been ob-
served difficulties with the financial stability of 
the NHIF. The constraints on the health bud-
gets are low allocations of capital investment 
and funds available for technology renewal (3).
 ❖ Ineffectively structured hospital sector (1) - 
despite about one third of the municipal and re-
gional hospitals were closed since the beginning 
of the reform there still has been an oversupply 
of hospital beds; Bed occupancy is relatively low 
and the length of stay is high; the infrastructure 
of the hospitals as buildings, equipment etc. is 
old and needs serious investment programme; 
the distribution of medical staff is inadequate 
(too many doctors, but small number of nurs-
es); Money did not always follow the patient. 
Often he was kept unduly in hospitals where 
the opportunities for diagnostics and medical 
treatment were exhausted, with the only pur-
pose the capital of the track to be absorbed. The 
severe cases that were taken in big hospitals for 
treatment when there was no other option also 
increased.
 ❖ A lack of managerial and administrative skills 
– this problem has led to the accumulation of 
large debts by inpatient facilities, which are cov-
ered often from the state budget. There are no 
stimuli for responsible and accountable man-
agement of health-related institutions and mea-
sures for performance assessment (33). Most of 
hospital managers are doctors, working part-
time in their wards and part-time as managers. 
Despite there was set an official requirement for 
a qualification or education in health care man-
agement for taking the position of hospital di-
rector, this is still not enough for proper hospi-
tal management. Lack of managerial skills and 
knowledge about the system is observed on ev-
ery level of the system.
 ❖ Law discordance – there is an incompleteness 
and lack of co-ordination between the different 
normative documents (primary and sub-dele-
gated legislation), that set the basic rules for ac-
tion of health establishments. This leads to poor 
collaboration and bad interaction between the 
primary care (GPs and emergency care centres), 
secondary care (medical centres) and tertiary 
care (hospitals, dispensaries, etc.).
 ❖ Transparency and corruption - hospital sec-
tor has the biggest concentration of risks and 
corruption practices (28). Co-payments are in-
creasing and informal payments are common 
– mostly for buying consumables, medicines, 
paying directly to the doctor for operation, for 
getting access to hospital, for birth and as a do-
nation to the hospital. Making the health sys-
tem more transparent continues to be a chal-
lenge (37).
 ❖ Hospital accreditation (started in 1997) - it 
didn’t achieve its main purpose to improve 
overall quality and often was regarded as an ad-
ministrative process that doesn’t add value to 
the management of the hospital but as a pure 
(often corrupted) control process. The quali-
ty of care is one of the problems in Bulgarian 
hospitals that provoke a wave of unsatisfied pa-
tients and society as a whole. Although Bulgar-
ia is on first place in EU as number of hospitals 
the quality of care is insufficient – that is why 7 
000 people had died in 2007 and they wouldn’t 
if they were treated in another country – for 7 
years with no real hospital reform it makes 49 
000 people.
 ❖ Society expectations - The various quality, eq-
uity, and efficiency problems and a substantial 
decrease in health outcomes (15) does not match 
the requirements and expectation of the society. 
The patients lost the privileges that they had in 
the previous system, dominated by the state (as 
total coverage and free access) but still don’t feel 
the advantages of the reform (competitiveness, 
choice, renewed equipment, high technologies, 
quality) – in the opposite – significant part of 
the population lost access to health services and 
those that have are not satisfied with the offered 
level and quality of care.
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DISCUSSION
The reform in Bulgaria didn’t achieve its main 
purpose and all the local and foreign experts share 
the same point of view about the necessity of discus-
sion around another way of transformation. Choos-
ing the right solution for the change needs to explore 
the reasons for the crash down. After all publications 
in Bulgaria media presenting analysis of the health 
reform and the opinions of foreign experts from 
World Bank for urgent changes, the Government fi-
nally admitted that the health system is malfunction-
ing and it must be performed an reorganization (16). 
There could be two main explications of the 
present situation in the health care in Bulgaria. We 
will represent them in two hypotheses: First hypoth-
esis: the crash down is a consequence of the lack of 
knowledge of the new public management model by 
the specialists from state bodies and hospital man-
agement teams; or, Second hypothesis: it is a result 
of the market failure mechanism called also adverse 
selection mechanism.
FIRST HYPOTHESIS 
Our observation showed that main actors in 
Bulgarian health care stage had not changed since 
the beginning of the reform. In the same time they 
weren’t involved in specific education. 
For instance, the main part of the young stu-
dents who study Health care management in Bul-
garian universities is now very pessimists about their 
possibility of integration in hospital management 
team or for responsible position in health care public 
administration. That is why they prefer working in 
pharmaceutical companies as well as different busi-
ness orientation and a part of them choose to emi-
grate. This is a problem for the future development of 
the health care system and its management. 
But who is responsible for that situation? At first 
place there is a simple answer – the state and the lo-
cal actors. Part of the responsibility maybe could be 
placed on the international partners and experts be-
cause of the proposed methodology. For instance lots 
of the models that had been proposed by the experts 
were only “copy and paste” from the models of West-
ern Europe or USA… 
Of course we can’t propose complete solu-
tion for this multifactorial problem. Perhaps a way 
out could be the better mix between contribution of 
the local and foreign experts, having in mind that 
most of international consultants arrive in Bulgar-
ia just for the duration of the project, they are work-
ing on. Another way could be the accent before im-
plementation of any change in the system to create 
a independent team of health care management lo-
cal specialists. We could add the example of France, 
where since 10 years lots of universities are involved 
in proving health care training.
Another reason for the crash down of the health 
reform might be explained with the new institution-
alism model. The actors in Bulgarian hospitals use 
different organizational frameworks to resist to the 
change process – as excuses are used three popu-
lar frameworks (24) – charity framework, according 
to which hospital has the historically inherited no-
ble role to serve to the health needs of population; 
professional framework, according to which the high 
level specificity of the knowledge of the doctors and 
their direct contact with the customer/patient de-
prives the hospital manager of its full control and the 
third framework – the socio-political framework.
Actually, we should take into account the pro-
found change represented by the implementation 
of the New Public Management model within the 
framework of the Bulgarian hospitals. In the dis-
courses of the international experts and as a result 
of the local political power, there appears the notion 
of market (quasi-market), present where all the ac-
counts of power rest upon another model, the one of 
“confidence” form within an almightily bureaucra-
cy. So, there is a displacement of objectives, without, 
however the change of actors, not even the elimina-
tion of the game of power. We notice then the super-
position of the two incompatible logics - the one of 
an agency relation, with the attached obstacles, es-
pecially the one of the moral hazard, and the other 
of the bureaucratic relations, with its individual ob-
stacle - the development of the vicious circles and the 
predominance of the rules over the result. 
SECOND HYPOTHESIS 
Perhaps here is the biggest problem. Bulgaria 
and in the same way the majority of Eastern coun-
tries follow the foreign models, especially the USA 
model, based on market regulation. The proof is the 
increasing number of private health establishments, 
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with a lack of control by the state. For instance, in 
Sofia, in the context of excessive number of beds in 
the acute hospitals, a new Japanese hospital was build 
with more than 1000 acute beds!  
How could be explained this situation? Certain-
ly the market regulation is not a good instrument in 
Bulgarian context. Obviously the opposite situation 
of full state regulation of health care system is not the 
right decision as well. The possible solution for Bul-
garia is a model that combines the implementation 
of the new public management model with the exist-
ing capacity of the state. In this way would be intro-
duced the supervised competition (10) as proposed 
by A. Enthoven in the reform of the National Health 
Service in UK. This model is perhaps the mean for 
better use of the local resources and the implementa-
tion of the contractual approach. 
Another explanation could be that the reform 
failed because of the agency theory problems - ad-
verse selection and moral hazard. These effects are 
especially strong when there are contradictions be-
tween the targets of the agent and principal, which 
differ a lot in Bulgarian context. The aim of the prin-
cipal is profit and effectiveness of hospital, and the 
aim of the hospital, represented by its manager is 
to serve to the public needs and to provide qualita-
tive care to population. Various mechanisms may 
be used to align the interests of the agent with those 
of the principal, such as piece rates/ commissions, 
profit sharing, efficiency wages, performance mea-
surement (including financial statements), the agent 
posting a bond, or fear of firing.
The hospital is naturally a strongly institution-
alized organization. In terms of the reform that has 
been described, the institutional staff seems to be 
used by the actors as a strong means of resistance to 
all the forms of change. Like within the other similar 
reform processes, as an example the hospitals or the 
universities in France, we notice that the values and 
the outlines, born by the universities, exist without 
having a precise formalization. It’s in the moment of 
change when these values, which are landmarks for 
the actors in the activity, formalize themselves and 
occur to be used, not with the view to an objective 
research of a better combination of services to face 
the needs of the population, but simply to justify the 
repetition of the existing organizational routine, in 
the course of which the actors find a form of safe-
ty of the uncertainty margin and gives them power. 
We explain thus the profound inertness of the system 
and, as well as we strongly underline - the absence of 
a true strategic approach of change. We notice at the 
same time different types of behavior, described by 
the many authors, like disengagement (it’s impossi-
ble not to remark the number of alienations, of giv-
ing up the medical practice, in favor of positions in 
the pharmaceutical laboratories, the distribution and 
the commercialization), negotiation, and also with 
no doubts - sabotage, a major obstacle to the reform, 
easy to use within a framework where the lobbying 
policy is exploited.
CONCLUSION
The supervised competition could be a solution 
in Bulgarian context. Its main advantage is that the 
state could keep the main part of its authority, while 
continuing to preserve the adverse effects of the mar-
ket. In the same time the reform in hospital sector is a 
necessity and for implementing the change effective-
ly, the state needs to change its role. 
From “controller” and “provider” it should 
adopt the “double role”, proposed by the super-
vised competition model. This new role of the state 
includes:
 ❖ Regulation authority – the state, as a represen-
tative of the customers, controls the prices and 
quantity of the health services, number of beds, 
days of stay according to international and Eu-
ropean standards.
 ❖ Competition authority – the state do not inter-
venes in the market, but only preserve the loyal-
ty of competition, for example by adopting and 
publishing national low for forbidding the mo-
nopoly in the health care system.
Change is the basic characteristic of every sys-
tem – it pumps progress, drives evolution and there-
fore is vital for life. The New Public Management 
model could be the driver for Bulgarian hospital re-
form that can give a possible cure trough changing 
the direction of the managerial logic and limiting the 
side effects of the relations, dominated by the public 
service agents, which the bureaucratic model cannot 
control. It will bring the spirit of venture in the public 
administration so that it can be guided by its mission 
and goals and not by rules and procedures. And all 
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this while the users will be considered as clients and 
the aim will be the final result, instead of resources.
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